Paper details
| Paper authors | Kouta FUTSUKI |
| In panel on | The politics of negotiating with authoritarian regimes |
| Paper presenter(s) will be presenting |
In-Person / |
Abstract
The paper investigates conditions enabling the regime's authority to allow ICRC access in detention facilities of military or civilians. Previous studies have investigated the parameters of the authority that permits such detainee access. ICRC can allegedly obtain detainee access more often if the authority has centralized command structure and motivation to comply with the demand of civilians.
However, those results cannot explain that some authorities permit after ICRC’s negotiation because such successful cases do not necessarily occur after a drastic change of the authority’s centralization or motivation. Then, the paper tackles the following question: why the authority grants ICRC detainee access even if the authority does not change so much?
The paper hypothesizes that ICRC’s involvement in building trust with the authority can work. The analysis employs logit regression in time series to identify quantitatively factors that cause authorities to change their attitudes to ICRC’s detainee access. The discussion considers if identified factors can be reduced to ICRC’s involvement or not. In conclusion, the paper implies practical recommendations for future involvement of ICRC with authority.
