Paper details

Paper authors	Aissami Abdou
In panel on	Beyond Trust: Rethinking Humanitarian Legitimacy in Times of Grassroots Power
Paper presenter(s) will be presenting	In-Person / Online

Abstract

Sahel regional context analysis at a glance, a humanitarian slant

Abstract:

As of late 2024, the Sahel region is experiencing significant geopolitical shifts and enduring humanitarian challenges. The ‘’Alliance des Etats du Sahel’’ (AES), comprising Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, has recently established a joint regional military operations theater to combat AQMI1 and IS affiliated groups, whose kinetic burden of activities in the region is the highest worldwide, beyond middle east and Asia. While the 3 countries confirm their exit from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), Chad has also requested the withdrawal of French military forces from its territory, a direction Senegal and even Ivory Coast is taking. Concurrently, Russian influence is expanding, with increased presence of troops in countries like Mali and Burkina Faso, raising concerns about the region's geopolitical realignment. Moreover, Turkey is increasingly looping into the region.
Humanitarian issues remain acute, with the Sahel bearing the highest global disease burden, including persistent crises such as malaria, diphtheria, and chronic undernutrition. Niger continues to have the world's highest fertility rate, averaging 6.6 children per woman, exacerbating pressures on limited resources. Climate change further intensifies resource scarcity, leading to conflicts between herders and farmers. Gender inequality persists, with the region exhibiting one of the widest gender gaps globally, particularly in education and health outcomes.
Addressing these complex challenges requires a paradigm shift towards often, inclusive, and context-specific interventions. Engaging local communities in decision-making, broadening the focus of humanitarian aid to include more vulnerable groups, and investing in local capacities are essential steps. Learning from past intervention failures is crucial to developing solutions that promote effective impact and stability in the Sahel region where Americans, Chinese, Russians, French/Europeans, Turkish and others continue to divert their cards.

1) Recent developments and geopolitical dynamics:
The overall context in Sahel region remains flimsy this end of the year with few developments. The AES or ASS (Alliance of Sahel states) just declared a joint regional military operations theater coexisting with the national ones. This move could hypothetically facilitate more coordinated actions against AQMI and IS-affiliated groups, which have established the largest concentration of their operations globally in the region, surpassing those in the Middle East and Asia (ACLED2). The ECOWAS has approved the ‘’Sahelexit’’ of the 3 countries with a so called ‘’reflection deadline’”, which was rejected by AES states.

AES accounts for more than 50% of geographical space (2.7km2) of ECOWAS, if size matters, while only 1/10 of the regional GDP with Nigeria being an outlier in this regard (363 BUSD, Word bank, 2023). On top of the 3 military regimes (Mali, Niger, and Burkina), Guinea remains also under military rule, though aligns more closely with western policies/interests in a way like the Gabon case. Civil society organizations and political parties announced that they would no longer recognize Guinea's government after December 31, marking the end of the transition period. Civil space/liberties remain there also under threat as in the Central Sahel countries. Niger and Guinea have not so far brought ‘’Russians troops’’ on their territories, maintaining a broader diplomatic spectrum in a way.
With the eviction of French troops from Tchad where they redeployed following the adventures of Mali, Niger, and Burkina, after EUTM3, Takouba4, Eucap (European landscape) trials, Wagner-Africa Corps strengthened their presence along with few (Sadat/Turkish) forces, which others said it’s not yet operational. Nigeria president, B Tinubu completed a state visit to France on 29/11/2024, something that has not happened for the past 23 years, what some speculate over as relationships strengthening including military ones. Niger president, A Tchiani in a speech accused Nigerian government of collusion with France to destabilize AES citing N Ribadu, national security advisor to President Tinubu, accusations rejected by Nigerian government.

The ‘’new/old’’ Lakurawa group started some minor attacks in the northwest Nigeria restating the regional scope of these non-state armed groups. Some of the recent attacks on the ‘’Oil pipeline’’ managed by West Africa Oil Pipeline Company (WAPCO) to take oil from Niger to Sea, through Seme Kpoji/Benin outline theses transnational interactions. Chinese got the main Oil deal in Niger during president M Tanja regime, which did not please other competitors. There is also the Trans-Saharan Gaz Pipeline (TSGP) project aiming to supply natural gas from Nigeria to Algeria as part of the options to diversity the European Union’s gas supply, something relevant in the current Russia/Ukraine war. The MNJTF (Multinational Joint Task Force) struggles to be effective on its fight against various Boko Haram dividends (ISWAP/ Bakura, JAS, Ansaru…). Benin has to face increasing threat in Atacora and Alibori in the vicinity of Penjari and W parcs bordering Burkina and Niger. Togo while affected in the north continues some diplomatic efforts as the ‘’negotiator’’ (with Senegal) between AES and ECOWAS.

The US after their expulsion from Niger maintained a conspicuous interest in the region supporting the National Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) in Abuja, established in 2012. Africom’s Grand African Navy Exercise for Maritime Operations (NEMO) seems to control jihadist groups capacity to reach the Atlantic Sea and replicate a Somalian model to prevent ‘’the so called ‘’Somalisation’’ of greater Sahel. Henceforth, Benin and Togo remain of interest with the efforts of various actors to support their armed forces despite a growing local sense of sovereignty which can explode at any time as seen in other parts of Africa. The situation in Ivory Coast, Cameroun, Gabon should be monitored with caution even if Senegal and Ghana are showing more stables pathways and nonviolent democratic regime changes.
In the past, regional militaries initiatives like G5 Sahel to which Mauritania (with whom NATO is strengthening cooperation) belonged, has failed to tackle multifactorial insecurity with Algeria holding in a way on the ‘’Comité d’état-Major Opérationnel Conjoint, “CEMOC” on its historical rivalry with Maroco on the ‘’Saharaoui’’ which produce ‘’coincidentally’’ 2 famous EIGS leaders in Liptako Gourma.

So far, the exit of AES from ECOWAS does not translate into immediate disruption of people, cattle and good movements, something to be monitored. It should be noted that despite some administrative boundaries, in different parts of the region, there is the same population on both sides of the borders. In some parts of Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Benin, Guinea, Ivory coast there is a strong socio-anthropological similarity between communities which is not often well factored in distant analysis. Its therefore difficult to separately analyze intra-national dynamics in the region ignoring historical and social correlations. The wider Sahel context should be analyzed simultaneously on Central Sahel, Lac Tchad Basin and Costal states angles even if often ‘’inter-national’’ variabilities arise. On another note, the region is affected by many economics chocs which are seen in the long-term inflation where the local purchasing power is severely eroded, mainly the one of low-income consumers, consistently classified as the ones having the lowest Human Development Index, HDI, by UNDP, due also to poor governance.
Interestingly, the contours of the actual AES zone, correspond to parts of some ancient empires (e.g. Macina, Sonrai, Sokoto…) fueling part of the ‘’historical pre-colonial’’ pride and sovereignty narratives though access to sea remains a crucial strategic objective for AES states.

2) Existing humanitarian and structural fragilities:
The Sahel continues to grapple with a range of chronic multidimensional vulnerabilities:

 Health: The region bears the highest worldwide global disease burden, from communicable, neonatal, maternal, and nutritional diseases (WHO Global Burden of Disease, GDB). Epidemics like Diphtheria, Cholera and chronic undernutrition are just surrogate proxies of the overall health fragility, coupled with the poorest health human resources.
 Demographics: Niger remains the world’s highest fertility rate country, with women averaging 6.6 children on average (UNFPA, 2024). This population growth places immense pressure on already fragile infrastructures and social systems. The situation is not far better in other places like north Nigeria, Mali to cite only those.
 Climate Change: Although Climate change affects different parts of the word, what is specific in Sahel is that it comes adding to wider vulnerability playing a role in local conflicts between herders and farmers with shrinkage of some water-points and rarefication of grassland (Kheira T and Anab O Grand, 2021), increasing desertification threaten food security and livelihood stability for millions. Floods are now seen in places like Tombouctou, Maiduguri, and Niamey.
 Gender Inequality: (Africa Gender Index Report 2019) indicates that the gender gap in the Sahel region remains the widest with an average of 31.9%. Gender indicators for education are among the worst in the world. Biases against women and gender inequality if not disproportionality are often correlated to structural and traditional fences. While this is mostly unacceptable, these situations need to be understood with a humble nonjudgmental eye to be able to understand the problem and support people in need.
 A sense of neglect and fatigue: With decades of instability and fragility in the region, there is sometime a sense of neglect and fatigue on the Sahel crisis. For instance, NRC classified Burkina Faso twice (2023/2024) as the word most neglected crisis, funding of the humanitarian and development programs traditionally from the global West, seems to correlate the geopolitical hindsight also liked to security and migration.
 Migration is often misapprehended when viewed solely through lens western lens. From a Sahelian perspective, migration is a complex response to political, security, economic hardship, and climate change. Main migration load in Sahel is primary intra-regional. S. Michailof, in his book Africanistan: Development or Jihad? critiques the repetitive nature of Western interventions in the Sahel, drawing parallels to failed strategies in Afghanistan and see migrants as future occupants of European slums. While 2024 was the deadliest year on record for migrants all routes combined, the one from Mauritania to Canari islands though the Atlantic is the deadliest route overhauling the Sahara route partly due to past Niger-EU deal.
 Trafficking routes: Sahel often serves as international smuggling corridors where drugs and other illegal goods for instance from Latina America are sometimes transferred to Europe using historical merchants and other routes like the ‘Salvador pass’’, correlated with illegal networks.
Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, a rooted expert of the region, in his book titled, ‘’L’enchevêtrement des crises au Sahel’’, explored the interconnected crises of the region, emphasizing the need for more nuanced understanding beyond the simplistic approaches and narratives. Something I usually call ‘’The Sahel cocktail’’, of course you can have various shades of the cocktail.
3) The humanitarian response and beyond, a change of mindset?
The overall response which palpably must be multidimensional is to be reinforced accounting for local realities, escape reproducing models that do not work or translating models that are not adapted to avoid the ‘’ Condemned to Repeat’’ described elsewhere by Fiona Terry, two decades back.

For instance, beyond women and children, Sahel humanitarian programs could account for specific clusters of vulnerability like Elderly (who are the cement and ‘’barometer’’ of communities in region), People with disability, various minorities, migrants/travel medicine, nomadic populations. A change of mindset in the way we approach Sahel region problems is key to pave new and more effective ways of dealing with local problems most often connected to regional and international drifts. Speaking out and historical testimonies are of great relevance when well analyzed and rooted in ‘’show/tell’’ and the goal to contribute improving the situation of people we help, also to safeguard operational space and security. If we save lives by speaking, knowing when and how to speak is also key in the region where various actors are spreading many contentious narratives for different reasons.

 Communities more on the ‘’Co-lead’’: Interventions must deeply involve local communities in problems identification and decision-making processes. Local actors including civils societies should be viewed as partners and active parts of aid more than passive receivers.

 Less arrogancy and condescendence: historically humanitarians have been the ones who have the resources, know how to do it, and don’t need the locals (unless when those are weak or at their service), don’t necessarily align to national directives even when these are relevant. A more respectful and humbler approach is needed to negotiate with various actors with the goal to reach and help people affected by various crisis.

 Inclusive Humanitarian aid: As cited, humanitarian programs should target more other vulnerable groups, such as the elderly, people with disabilities, various minorities, migrants, and nomadic populations with tailored adapted response, following local concertation.

 Strengthening Local Capacities: Even if it looks sometimes counter intuitive to humanitarian response, local capacity building should be carefully assessed. Often communities and local actors are the first responders to crisis situations, and we need them to start with. For instance, cyclic malnutrition projects in Sahel despite very good results in case management show failure to transfer capacity and strengthen local responses. Investing in local actors without compromising the principles of neutrality and impartiality should be on the table.

 Learning from Past Failures: The Sahel has seen repeated failures of international intervention models. Documenting, learning from these mistakes and adapting strategies to fit the local context is key to avoiding the perpetual repetition cycles of new crisis with old recipients.

Conclusion:
The Sahel is a region marked by profound geopolitical, social, and humanitarian complexities. As external actors vie for influence, the region’s ability to navigate these shifting dynamics will largely depend on its internal cohesion and local resilience. Humanitarian actors must adopt a more flexible, localized, and inclusive approach to address the region's multiple crises backed by a solid apprehension of local realities. Only by understanding the intricate connections between political, cultural, historical, and economic and environmental factors can effective responses be deployed in the region where we must remain and work in solidarity with affected population.

-Annexes of 2 Maps

Aissami Abdou, PhD,
Ops coordinator, Sahel/cell 2, OCB, Brussels, December 30th, 2024
Bibliography: (selected and random classification)

1. ‘’What Future for the Western Sahel? The region’s demography and its implications by 2045’’ Richard Cincotta and Stephen Smith, 2021

2. ‘’The rising burden of non-communicable diseases in sub-Saharan Africa’’, The Lancet Global Health, ISSN: 2214-109X, Vol: 7, Issue: 10, Page: e1295-e1296, Year 2019

3. Africa Gender Index Report 2019, What the 2019 Africa Gender Index tells us about gender equality, and how canit be achieved.March 2020

4. UNDESA, Population Division, World Population Pros-pects 2019, POP/DB/WPP/Rev.2019 (data); Data for the northern Nigeria model were obtained from state figures provided by the Nigerian DHS and Nigerian statistical publications, and modeled using Avenir

5. UN: Sahel region one of the most vulnerable to climate change, https://www.climatecentre.org/981/un-sahel-region-one-of-the-most-vulnerable-to-climate-change/

6. Livelihood Security: Climate Change, Migration and Conflict in the Sahel, https://publications.iom.int/books/livelihood-security-climate-change-migration-and-conflict-sahel

7. Michailof, Serge (2018), Africanistan. Development or Jihad, New Delhi: Oxford University Press, ISBN 9780199485666 (hardback),

8. ACLED. "Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project." ACLED, 2024, www.acleddata.com.

9. Michailof, Serge. Africanistan: Development or Jihad? Fayard, 2016.

10. Mali-Sahel, notre Afghanistan à nous ? (2022), Seidik Abba

11. Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre. L’enchevêtrement des crises au Sahel – Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso. Karthala, 2021.

12. Terry, Fiona. Condemned to Repeat: The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. Cornell UP, 2002.

13. UNFPA. "Fertility Trends in the Sahel." United Nations Population Fund, 2024, www.unfpa.org.

14. World Bank. "Nigeria: GDP (Current US$)." World Bank, 2023, https://data.worldbank.org/country/nigeria.

15. World Bank. Gross Domestic Product 2023 Report. World Bank Data Catalog, 2023, https://datacatalogfiles.worldbank.org/ddh-published/0038130/DR0046441/GDP.pdf.

16. Climate-related Peace and Security Risks in Africa – ACCORD, (Kheira T/ Anab O Grand, 2021)




1) AQMI : Al Qaida au Maghreb Islamique (JNIM Katibas, JAS, Ansaru...), IS : Islamic State (EIGS, ISWAP, Lakurawa…)
2)ACLED : Armed Conflict Location and Event Data
3)EUTM: European Union Training Mission
4)Takouba: A special forces collection of units from different European countries in Mali (France, Sweden, Denmark….)

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